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INTRODUCTION 
In the district court opinion that would form the basis of the appeal in Beary 
Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan, Judge James Zagel remarked that “[p]laintiffs have 
produced some eyebrow-raising figures that suggest that Defendant [Catherine 
Shannon, then the director of the Illinois Department of Labor] is doing no favors 
for the taxpayers of the State of Illinois.”1 He then elaborated in a footnote:  
To take just one example, on Federal and private landscaping 
projects undertaken in Cook County, the going rate for a 
“landscape helper” in June 2010 was $11.50 per hour in total 
compensation. The same person working a state-funded project 
would receive a total hourly compensation package of $52.70—
that is, 458% of the comparable federal or private rate.2 
The disparity in those two figures is shocking, though it is not 
representative of the average disparity between Illinois rates and private or federal 
rates for every worker classification. However, it does bring into focus the 
artificiality of the concept of a prevailing wage and elucidate one of the perils of 
employing price controls in the labor market.  
A primary reason for the difference in the two wages is that Illinois does not 
distinguish between landscapers and ordinary laborers.3 Another relates to the fact 
that the Illinois Prevailing Wage Act, like many prevailing wages laws, does not 
recognize a category of workers called “helpers.”4 Using helpers to do much of 
the “grunt work” on a job, while simultaneously giving them a chance to learn the 
trade, is one thing that non-union contractors do to control costs because helpers 
are paid much less than union journeymen.5 But the unions seem to exert enough 
influence in Illinois to have prevented the legal recognition of helpers in the 
Illinois Prevailing Wage Act, thus requiring the state to pay a landscaping helper 
as much as a laborer.  
 This Note uses the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Beary 
Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan as an occasion to analyze the Illinois Prevailing 
Wage Act (“Prevailing Wage Act” or “Act”). In Beary, a group of ten landscaping 
contractors sought to enjoin the director of the Illinois Department of Labor from 
                                                 
1 Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Shannon, 2011 WL 1100213, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff’d sub nom, 
Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan, 667 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 354 
(2012). 
2 Id. at *6 n.1. 
3 See infra subpart III(A). 
4 See George C. Leef, Prevailing Wage Laws: Public Interest or Special Interest Legislation?, 30 
CATO J. 137, 145 (2010). 
5 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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setting the prevailing wage rate by relying on the rates in the collective bargaining 
agreement of the union historically relied on for wage rates.6 The contractors 
argued that this amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority 
to private parties.7 Though they did not succeed, Beary revealed serious problems 
with the Prevailing Wage Act. 
This Note will first discuss how the Act functions. Then, it will detail the 
challenges brought by the group of landscaping contractors in Beary and in 
Illinois Landscape Contractors Ass’n v. Department of Labor, an Illinois 
Appellate Court decision that effectively dictated Beary’s outcome. It will 
proceed with an application of public choice theory to the Prevailing Wage Act, 
arguing the Act is a quintessential example of interest group legislation that 
benefits a concentrated group at the expense of a diffused group. Central to this 
point is a unique provision in the Act that allows only wages paid on public works 
projects to be used in the calculation of the prevailing wage.8  
Ultimately, this Note addresses how incentive structures inherent in the law 
invite governmental largesse, if not outright corruption. The best solution is 
simply to repeal the Act, particularly because the courts have made it clear they 
have no interest in fixing the legislature’s mess.9 This Note suggest that, if the law 
is to be retained at all, the Illinois Department of Labor (IDOL) should be 
required to conduct scientific wage surveys using data from private and public 
works when calculating the wage rates. Furthermore, a new classification should 
be added for landscaping helpers that continue to be subject to the Prevailing 
Wage Act. 
I. THE ILLINOIS PREVAILING WAGE ACT 
A. The Origin of the Illinois Prevailing Wage Act 
 During the New Deal, Congress passed the Davis-Bacon Act, requiring 
that the prevailing wage be paid to all workers on federally funded public works 
projects.10 Though Congress’s exact reasons for passing the law are unclear, it 
                                                 
6 See Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan, 667 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
354 (2012). The Department used to conduct wage surveys and compare them to the rates 
submitted, but has admittedly not conducted any such survey since 2001. See infra subpart III(B). 
7 See Beary, 667 F.3d at 949-50 (7th Cir. 2012). 
8 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.  130/2 (West 2008). 
9 The Illinois Landscape Contractors Association and similarly minded organizations should 
concentrate their efforts on a democratic solution to their prevailing wage woes rather than waste 
more resources on a judicial one. 
 
10 Herbert R. Northrup & Augustus T. White, Subsidizing Contractors to Gain Employment: 
Construction Union ‘Job Targeting’, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 62, 77-78 (1996). 
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appears to have been part of a scheme of Keynesian deficit spending in response 
to the Great Depression.11 The arguably sensible rationale was that, in its attempt 
to boost incomes and thereby increase consumer spending, the government should 
not pay laborers less than what they usually made.12 
 Many states passed similar laws for state-funded public works projects, 
which became known as “Little Davis-Bacons.”13 The Prevailing Wage Act is 
Illinois’ “Little Davis-Bacon.”14 It has been suggested that the state versions of 
the Davis-Bacon Act were based less on a coherent economic program than on a 
general desire to help labor.15 Specifically, scholars suspect that the primary 
purpose of enacting the state prevailing wage laws was to ensure that white union 
workers received government contracts; the laws undercut the incentive to hire 
minorities who underbid them.16 Whatever their origin, prevailing wage laws 
draw criticism for almost uniformly setting the prevailing wage at or near union 
scale.17 
 Little has been written about the origins of the Prevailing Wage Act. The 
first two attempts to enact a prevailing wage act in Illinois were struck down by 
the Illinois Supreme Court on constitutional grounds.18 The legislature 
successfully passed the Prevailing Wage Act on its third attempt. That version of 
the Act endures, though it has been subjected to a considerable number of 
amendments.19 One such amendment, passed in 1961, added statutory language 
that makes the current Prevailing Wage Act very different from its federal 
                                                 
11 See id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 80. 
14 See generally Sarah Glassman, et. al., The Federal Davis-Bacon Act: The Prevailing 
Mismeasure of Wages, BEACON HILL INST. AT SUFFOLK U. (2008), available at 
http://www.beaconhill.org/BHIStudies/PrevWage08/ DavisBaconPrevWage080207Final.pdf.   
15 Id. 
16 See, e.g., David Bernstein, The Shameful, Wasteful History of New York’s Prevailing Wage Act, 
7 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1 (1997); Editorial, Sop for Labor: Saving Davis-Bacon, CHI. TRIB., 
April 17, 1995, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1995-04-
17/news/9504170003_1_davis-bacon-act-unions-compliance-costs. But see Hamid Azari-Rad & 
Peter Philips, Thoughtless Think Tanks: Sound Bite Thinking and The History and Intent of 
Prevailing Wage Law, in THE ECONOMICS OF PREVAILING WAGE LAWS (2005).   
17 RICHARD VEDDER, MACKINAC CENT. FOR PUB. POL’Y, MICHIGAN’S PREVAILING WAGE LAW 
AND ITS EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND CONSTRUCTION EMPLOYMENT (1999), 
available at http://propertytaxrepeal.com/Misc Info/PW combined.pdf. 
18 See Bradley v. Casey, 114 N.E.2d 681, 683 (Ill. 1953) (“The first prevailing wage act enacted in 
1931 was declared unconstitutional the same year. . . . In 1939, a second prevailing wage act was 
passed and it was declared unconstitutional in 1940.”); Mayhew v. Nelson, 178 N.E. 921, 924 
(1931) (holding that the law was unconstitutional for delegating legislative powers to 
administrative officers and vagueness); Reid v. Smith, 30 N.E.2d 908, 912-13 (1940) (voiding law 
on substantive economic due process grounds). 
19 See Bradley, 114 N.E.2d at 683. 
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counterpart and from the wage laws of most states20 in that it limits the data used 
in the government’s calculations of the prevailing wage to wages paid “on public 
works.”21 
B. Historic Cases Regarding the Constitutionality of the Act. 
 The Illinois Supreme Court has twice dealt with constitutional challenges 
to the wage determination procedures under the Act. In Bradley v. Casey, the 
court held that an amendment unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to 
private parties22 and, in Hayen v. Ogle County, it held that the Act’s language 
meant that private wages could not be considered when calculating the prevailing 
wage rate.23 These cases helped shape the arguments in Beary. 
1. Bradley v. Casey 
 In Bradley, a taxpayer challenged the 1951 Amendment to the Prevailing 
Wage Act, which set the prevailing wage in any trade according to the rates 
contained in a collective bargaining agreement.24 The court held the provision 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it delegated a legislative function to private 
parties.25 It worried that this wage-setting process “permit[ted] the fixing of the 
standard rather than finding or ascertaining an existing fact.”26 
 It is not difficult to see why the plaintiffs in Beary were tempted to draw 
on this line of argument. In their petition for certiorari, they noted that the 
language was removed from the statute but that “IDOL never changed its 
procedure,” and that it still “engaged in the same deference to the parties 
negotiating CBAs that the Illinois Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional in 
1953.”27 This is not entirely true, since IDOL conducted some wage surveys in 
                                                 
20 See infra subpart IV(B). 
21 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.  130/2 (West 2008) (“The terms ‘general prevailing rate of hourly 
wages’, ‘general prevailing rate of wages’ or ‘prevailing rate of wages’ when used in this Act 
mean the hourly cash wages plus fringe benefits for training and apprenticeship programs 
approved by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training, health and 
welfare, insurance, vacations and pensions paid generally, in the locality in which the work is 
being performed, to employees engaged in work of a similar character on public works.”) 
(emphasis added). 
22 114 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Ill. 1953). 
23 463 N.E.2d 124, 125-26 (Ill. 1984). 
24 Bradley, 114 N.E.2d at 682. 
25 Id. at 685. 
26 Id. 
27 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan, 667 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 354 (2012) (No. 12-129). 
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the period between Bradley and Beary, but it does accurately describe its practice 
in the last decade.28 
2. Hayen v. Ogle County 
 In 1961, the Prevailing Wage Act was amended to define the “prevailing 
rate of wages” as “the hourly cash wages plus fringe benefits . . . in the locality in 
which the work is being performed, to employees engaged in work of a similar 
character on public works.”29 The amendment set the prevailing wage at union 
scale in many cases, and this upset the Ogle County government. Thus, it simply 
ignored the “on public works” language and continued including private wages in 
its prevailing wage calculations.30 Angered by the government’s deliberate 
eschewal of the law, union representatives filed an objection that led to a brief 
hearing where it was determined that the prevailing wage would be calculated 
using both public and private wages.31 The union representatives appealed to the 
circuit court, and won.32 
 The Ogle County government appealed all the way to the Illinois Supreme 
Court, raising a number of constitutional objections to the Act, which were all 
rejected.33 The unifying thread of Ogle County’s claims was that the Act was 
“arbitrary and irrational,” and was therefore unconstitutional on substantive due 
process grounds. Unimpressed, the Court noted that the county’s objections were 
properly made to the legislature and not the courts.34 The court held that the Act 
was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of “having the work 
performed under conditions which give some assurance that the work will be 
completed without interruptions or delay by workmen of average skill.”35  
                                                 
28 See infra subpart III(A). 
29 See Hayen v. Ogle County, 463 N.E.2d 124, 125 (Ill. 1984) (emphasis added). 
30 Id. at 126. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 126-29. 
34 Id.at 128 (“We hold that the Prevailing Wage Act does not violate the due process clause, for it 
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate State interest. . . . Although the contractors complain 
about the deleterious consequences of this legislative scheme, these effects simply are a result of 
the legislature's decision to stabilize labor conditions on public works projects by creating a 
prevailing wage base. Whether or not the legislature's scheme is worth the price, the Prevailing 
Wage Act is constitutional under the minimum-rationality standard of the due process and equal 
protection clauses.”). 
35 Id. (quoting Bradley v. Casey, 114 N.E.2d 681, 686 (Ill. 1953)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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II. LANDSCAPING UNDER THE PREVAILING WAGE ACT 
A. Background 
Whether landscaping work falls within the scope of the Prevailing Wage 
Act has been a subject of some contention over the last decade. Some 
municipalities and contractors were unsure whether they were required to pay the 
prevailing wage when they hired companies for landscaping work, which they 
considered maintenance and not a form of construction.36 Michael Janois, the 
village manager of Mount Prospect, Illinois, lamented what he viewed as a new 
interpretation of the Act—arguing that requiring the prevailing wage for 
landscaping “is like a backdoor unfunded mandate,” and estimating it would cost 
the Village an additional $790,000.37 
Mystified that municipal governments were confused about the applicability 
of the prevailing wage to landscaping projects, IDOL added a reminder on its 
website in 2011.38 Its stance is that landscaping work has always been within the 
scope of the Prevailing Wage Act.39 The Act defines “construction” as “all work 
on public works involving laborers, workers or mechanics. This includes any 
maintenance, repair, assembly, or disassembly work performed on equipment 
whether owned, leased, or rented.”40 Maintenance can be read to include 
landscaping, so IDOL’s position may be reasonable. But some, like Janois and 
Larry Frang, executive director of the Illinois Municipal League, claim that 
enforcement of the Prevailing Wage Act has expanded recently to include 
maintenance work that was previously exempt.41  
                                                 
36 See Political Struggle Over Prevailing Wage Act, IRRIGATION & GREEN INDUSTRY (Jan. 30, 
2012), http://www.igin.com/article-2617-political_struggle_over_prevailing_wage.html. 
37 Id.; see also Madhu Krishnamurthy & Steve Zalusky, State Act Could Mean Higher 
Landscaping Costs for Suburbs, THE DAILY HERALD (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20120123/news/701239874/.html. 
38 Krishnamurthy & Zalusky, supra note 37 (“Though some municipal officials may not have been 
aware of it, Illinois Department of Labor spokeswoman Anjali Julka said landscaping and other 
maintenance work paid for through public funds always has been included under the Prevailing 
Wage Act. ‘In 2011, the Illinois Department of Labor had emphasized through a reminder on its 
website of the inclusion of landscaping in relation to public works projects, public funding and 
improvement of public property to help avoid any confusion and misinterpretation,’ Julka said.”). 
39 Id. 
40 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/2 (West 2008). 
41 Khrisnamurthy & Zalusky, supra note 37. Janois noted that he attended a seminar held by an 
IDOL representative who claimed that basically any maintenance work, except custodial work, 
that requires a screwdriver falls within the scope of the Act, and that tree planting and removal 
also fell within the scope of the Act because it “changes the landscape.” Id. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2012 
 396
Local governments are required to adopt the wage rates annually.42 
Members of some of those governments, like Burr Ridge, have used the annual 
adoption as an opportunity to publicly condemn the law.43 A few years ago, 
officials in Rolling Meadows, Illinois symbolically refused to adopt the Act, even 
though the village continued to pay the wage rates required by the state.44 In 2007, 
the Heartland Institute noted that there was a “grassroots rebellion brewing in 
Illinois,” and that several Adams County officials questioned the validity of the 
state’s wage rates and had begun determining their own home rule rates.45 Adams 
County is not alone. Resistance to the Act among municipalities seems to have 
intensified in the last few years, with more and more municipalities conducting 
their own wage surveys and preempting the state law with home rule rates.46 
There has also been increasing support for attempts of groups like the Illinois 
Landscape Contractors Association to fight the law in the courts and legislature.47 
B. The State Law Challenge to the Act’s Classification of Landscapers as 
“Laborers” 
In order to understand Beary, one must first look to the earlier decision of 
Illinois Landscape Contractors Ass’n v. Department of Labor, which involved 
some of the same plaintiffs involved in Beary.48 Justice Bowman’s opinion 
explains IDOL’s current practice of ascertaining the prevailing wage, details how 
the Act is arguably broken, and points out how the name of the Prevailing Wage 
Act seems at odds with how it functions in reality.   
In Illinois Landscape Contractors Ass’n v. Department of Labor, a group of 
landscaping contractors appealed an unsuccessful challenge to their classification 
as “laborers.”49 Pursuant to Section 9 of the Act, the Illinois Landscape 
Contractors Association (ILCA) had previously challenged the classification in an 
                                                 
42 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/2 (West 2008). Apparently, this provision is distinctive. See 
David Denholm, Prevailing Wage Controversy Continues, HEARTLANDER MAGAZINE (Nov. 1, 
2007), http://news.heartland.org/ newspaper-article/2007/11/01/prevailing-wages-controversy-
continues (“[Illinois] has an unusual provision in its prevailing wage law requiring all local 
government agencies to resolve to adopt the state prevailing wage or determine their own.”). 
43 Sandy Illian Bosch, Despite Objections, Burr Ridge Passes Prevailing Wage, THE DOINGS 
WEEKLY, July 29, 2012 (on file with author) (noting that the board passed the resolution 
“begrudgingly,” and that Trustee Al Paveza described the current wage rates as “almost 
outrageous”). 
44 Kate Gibson, Lack of Wage Rule Angers Residents, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 2003, at A6. 
45 Denholm, supra note 42. 
46 See Krishnamurthy & Zalusky, supra note 37 (citing Naperville as an example of a town that 
has preempted the law by conducting surveys and setting its own rates). 
47 Id. 
48 866 N.E.2d 592 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
49 Id.at 595. 
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administrative hearing before IDOL—seeking to establish the new categories of 
“plantsman,” “lead plantsman,” and “landscape installer.”50 
Part of the impetus for this challenge was a change in 2004 of the union to 
which most workers and contractors performing landscape work belonged.51 
Formerly represented by the Laborers Union, the contractors and laborers chose 
joint representation by Local 150 of the Operating Engineers Union and 
Teamsters Union Local 703.52 The contractors and laborers entered into a new 
collective bargaining agreement with those unions (the Landscape CBA), which 
differed from their former agreement in that it adopted a separate wage schedule 
for landscape workers that included “wages up to $15.62 per hour.”53 
At the time of ILCA’s challenge, “the prevailing wage for laborers working 
on public projects subject to the Prevailing Wage Act was $36.72 per hour in 
wages and benefits.”54 Part of the contractors’ motivation in switching unions was 
to escape the wage rates in their collective bargaining agreement with the 
Laborers Union. But IDOL does not accept new classifications simply because it 
is presented with a new collective bargaining agreement. Instead, the party 
petitioning for a new classification must prove at a Section 9 hearing that the 
work involved in the proposed category is “sufficiently dissimilar” from work 
involved in all existing classifications to merit the inclusion of a new one.55 
At ILCA’s Section 9 hearing, Carla Pulley testified about IDOL’s wage-
setting process. Pulley described her position as “a certifying officer with the 
Conciliation and Mediation Division” of the Department of Labor, who is 
responsible for ascertaining and publishing the prevailing wage rates for the 
construction trades.56 Pulley indicated that IDOL used to conduct surveys to 
determine the prevailing wage for each trade, but that no such survey has been 
conducted since 2001. Instead, the department simply sets the prevailing wage 
rate at the rates established in the collective bargaining agreement of one union 
per trade.57 For landscaping, IDOL has historically used the rates set by the 
Laborers Union, and the administrative law judge who presided over the hearing 
was not convinced that landscape work was sufficiently dissimilar to the work of 
“laborers” to merit a new classification.58 
                                                 
50 Id. 




55 Id. at 596; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/4(e) (2008). 
56 Ill. Landscape Contractors Ass’n, 866 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 597-600. 
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Justice Bowman, writing for the court, was unimpressed with ILCA’s 
arguments on appeal and affirmed the judgment of the administrative law judge.59 
Justice Bowman did opine briefly, however, on the peculiarity of the law. 
Hayen and the Prevailing Wage Act itself present this court with a 
test of counterintuition, as one would think that the ‘prevailing 
wages’ would reflect the average prevailing wages paid to 
employees on projects across the public and private sectors. Even 
the federal government adopts such an interpretation, as ILCA 
points out.60 
Still, Justice Bowman pointed out the futility of what ILCA sought to 
accomplish by asking that new wage classifications be recognized: 
In this case, following the Prevailing Wage Act and Hayen leads to 
disjointed reasoning. Landscape workers are currently covered by 
[IDOL’s] laborer classification and getting paid approximately $36 
per hour on public works projects. [I]DOL cannot consider what 
landscape workers are paid on private sector projects in 
determining wages or a new classification. Therefore, even if 
[I]DOL recognized this new class, it could not lower the hourly 
wage, because its research would be limited to the $36 per hour 
that landscape workers are paid on public works projects rather 
than the lower wages they are paid on private sector jobs. While 
this is counterintuitive, it is the current outcome under Hayen and 
the Prevailing Wage Act.61 
In sum, even if the court had agreed with ILCA’s argument that a new 
category was warranted, the result ultimately would have been the same because 
the court held that the findings of the agency were reasonable under the quite 
deferential “clearly erroneous” standard of review.62 
C. The Failed Non-Delegation Challenge to the Act in Beary v. Costigan 
                                                 
59 Id. at 604. 
60 Id. at 603. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 600 (“While the agency is awarded deference, a reviewing court will reverse the agency 
decision when there is evidence supporting reversal and the reviewing court is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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 In Beary, ten landscaping contractors had been faced with state court 
enforcement actions for violating the Prevailing Wage Act63 that were stayed 
when the defendant-contractors joined together to challenge the constitutionality 
of the Act in federal court under an obscure offshoot of the non-delegation 
doctrine.64 The Prevailing Wage Act requires that IDOL make annual findings 
every June about the current prevailing wage rates for each trade in a given 
locality.65 Once the department makes these findings, any affected party is 
allowed thirty days to challenge the findings in a Section 9 hearing.66 As 
discussed above, IDOL’s current method of ascertaining the wage is to look to the 
collective bargaining agreement of the union historically relied upon for the 
relevant category of laborer.67 The plaintiffs in Beary argued that by merely 
rubber-stamping the wages submitted by unions, IDOL had unconstitutionally 
delegated a governmental function to private parties.68 
Although winning a non-delegation challenge would have been very 
difficult regardless, Judge Posner’s opinion in Beary shows that he did not 
understand the mechanics of the Act well enough to understand the crux of the 
plaintiff’s futility defense to their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.69 
Judge Posner acknowledged that the plaintiffs were not objecting to the 
determination in Illinois Landscape Contractors Ass’n v. Department of Labor, 
but thought they were objecting to IDOL’s rubber-stamping of the wage rates in 
the Laborers Union agreement as the prevailing wage for “plantsmen.”70 In the 
opinion, he describes the plaintiffs’ objection as follows: “Maybe plantsmen on 
public projects are actually paid a different wage, and that different wage is the 
prevailing wage for such workers.”71 
                                                 
63 Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan, 667 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
354 (2012). 
64 Id.; see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2–619(a)(3) (West 2008) (permitting a stay when 
another action is pending between the same parties involving the same claim).  
65 Beary, 667 F.3d at 948 (noting that the rates for each trade are usually broken down by county). 
66 Id.; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/9 (2008) (“At any time within 30 days after the Department of 
Labor has published on its official web site a prevailing wage schedule, any person affected 
thereby may object in writing to the determination or such part thereof as they may deem 
objectionable by filing a written notice with the public body or Department of Labor, whichever 
has made such determination, stating the specified grounds of the objection.”). 
67 See supra subpart III(B). 
68 Beary, 667 F.3d at 949-50. 
69 See id. at 950. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. Posner had already noted that the plaintiffs’ challenge was based on “an offshoot of the 
constitutional nondelegation doctrine that is applicable to the states [and] forbids them to authorize 
private persons to deprive other private persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.” Id.  
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But this statement frames the issue incorrectly. The only way plantsmen 
could be paid a different wage on public works projects would be for contractors 
to violate the terms of the Prevailing Wage Act.72 Since the department refuses to 
consider evidence of wages paid on public works projects that violate the 
Prevailing Wage Act, it would literally be impossible for the plaintiffs to present 
evidence at the Section 9 hearing that plantsmen were in fact paid a different 
wage on public works projects sufficient to prove that IDOL’s findings were 
wrong.73 For that reason, the contractors argued that the prevailing wage rates had 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy, which made raising such objections to the 
agency futile.74 
Nonetheless, the court refused to excuse the plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies by requesting a Section 9 hearing because, “if the 
plaintiffs’ challenge succeeded, . . . the Department would be required to 
recalculate the wage.”75 Here too, the court was wrong. As the court in Illinois 
Landscape Contractors Ass’n v. Department of Labor explained, “plantsman” 
does not exist as a category, so the plaintiffs’ challenge would be limited to 
showing that the wage for “laborer” is wrong while the department could simply 
point to the Laborers Union agreement to conclude that the wage determination 
was reasonable. Furthermore, even if IDOL were to consider whether the wages 
paid to plantsmen differed from those paid to laborers, the result would be the 
same because (1) the calculation would be limited to wages paid on public works 
projects, and (2) the wages paid on public works projects are dictated by the 
prevailing wage for laborers.76 
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision.77 In the 
opinion, Judge Posner noted that the administrative and judicial remedies afforded 
to the plaintiffs proved they were not denied due process.78 Furthermore, Judge 
Posner explained that the thirty days the Act provides for the filing of an objection 
                                                 
72 The district court opinion shows that Judge Zagel understood this point. See Beary Landscaping, 
Inc. v. Shannon, 2011 WL 1100213, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff’d sub nom, Beary Landscaping, Inc. 
v. Costigan, 667 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 354 (2012) (“Plaintiffs 
contend that seeking relief from the wage determinations in these Section 9 hearings is ‘futile,’ 
because ‘[o]nce IDOL certifies and publishes the rates in a CBA, IDOL considers payment of any 
wage or fringe benefit at a lower rate unlawful and refuses to consider evidence of payment of any 
such lower rate in any hearing under Section 9.’ If wage determination challenges were deemed 
final and unreviewable at that point, Plaintiffs might have a case that the state process is 
constitutionally deficient. But they are not: the [Act] explicitly provides for judicial review on top 
of the administrative process.”). 
73 Id. 
74 See Beary, 667 F.3d at 949. 
75 Id. at 952. 
76 See supra subpart III(B). 
77 Beary, 667 F.3d at 953. 
78 Id. at 952. 
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to wage determinations was so proximate to the wage determination that it 
“make[s] the challenge proceeding part of the wage-setting process rather than 
process belatedly bestowed after an unconstitutional delegation is complete.”79 
The plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari on July 23, 2012,80 but were denied on 
October 1, 2012.81 
III. THE PREVAILING WAGE ACT: A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 
Beary illustrates the problems inherent in limiting prevailing wage 
calculations to wages paid for public works projects. In particular, the opinion 
highlights how IDOL’s method of caluculating the prevailing wage renders 
administrative and judicial review of wage determinations meaningless. Part IV 
first lays out how the restriction of prevailing wage calculations to wages paid on 
public works projects precludes meaningful judicial review. Then, it compares 
Illinois’s definition of the prevailing wage to those of other states with labor-
protective prevailing wage acts to show that Illinois is alone in restricting its wage 
measurement to wages paid for public works projects. Finally, it introduces a 
public choice perspective on interest group legislation and agency capture to shed 
light on what is happening in Illinois. 
A. The Lack of Meaningful Judicial Review Under Section 9 
The Beary plaintiffs chose to pursue their challenge before they exhausted 
the administrative remedies available to them under Section 9 of the Act.82 As 
such, the way was clear for the court to disregard the as-applied constitutional 
challenge. The plaintiffs claimed that challengers in a Section 9 hearing face an 
insurmountable burden because the determinations are a self-fulfilling prophecy 
and, therefore, a Section 9 hearing was not worth the plaintiffs’ time or effort in 
challenging wage determinations.83 In turn, the plaintiffs’ attempt to justify their 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies reveals a troubling public policy 
problem. 
A lack of meaningful judicial review of these plaintiffs’ claims sounds like 
fertile ground for a due process challenge. But the bar for due process is quite low 
and a Section 9 hearing clears it easily. Due process requires only notice, and a 
                                                 
79 Id. at 953. 
80 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 27, at 23.  
81 See Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan, 133 S. Ct. 354 (2012). 
82 Beary, 667 F.3d at 951-953. 
83 Brief for Appellant at 13-14, Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan, 667 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 354 (2012) (No. 11-1920). The plaintiffs made also an entirely 
unconvincing argument that they were not “affected” by the rates until IDOL commenced an 
enforcement action against them, which is a creative but wrong interpretation of 820 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 130/9 (2008). 
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chance to object (in person or in writing) to the action being taken.84 Because the 
Act allows plaintiffs to request a Section 9 hearing, and to grumble about the 
injustice of the Prevailing Wage Act, no due process violation occurs. Even if the 
Act’s review procedures meet the constitutional minimum, however, they still 
leave much to be desired. 
Recall Illinois Landscape Contractors Ass’n v. Department of Labor, where 
landscape contractors pursued a Section 9 hearing to request that IDOL recognize 
a new classification for landscaping work.85 The court pointed out that the “on 
public works” language led to “disjointed reasoning.”86 But even if the court were 
to recognize landscaping work as a new category, what would that mean? As the 
court noted, the prevailing wage for landscape workers would be measured by 
what they had been paid on public works projects. This means the data used to 
determine the wage rate for the new classification would reflect what these 
workers were paid under the previous classification of “laborer.” In short, even if 
a challenger wins at a Section 9 hearing, and forces IDOL to create a new 
classification, the challenger still loses. 
Furthermore, even when challenging a wage determination for an existing 
category, the procedure in a Section 9 hearing is a bit of a sham—at least insofar 
as it is supposed to guard against agency capture or manipulation of wages by the 
unions. Suppose that a contractor raises a timely objection to the wage for 
laborers. The only evidence the court will be allowed to consider is evidence of 
what was paid on public works contracts that complied with whatever the 
prevailing wage was the last time the agency made findings.87 This can hardly be 
said to safeguard against unions gaming the system, as one union did in General 
Electric Co. v. New York Dep’t. of Labor when it included two rates in its 
collective bargaining agreement: one rate for private works, and another rate for 
public works that was nearly double the former rate.88 Nothing in the Illinois 
system of review prevents unions from inflating the wage rates on public works 
above rates paid on private works through similar, or more discreet, arrangements. 
Requiring IDOL to use private wages in the calculation of the prevailing 
wage would solve this problem; it would remove the possibility of unions gaming 
the system by setting a different price for public works projects than for private 
                                                 
84 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); see also Michalowicz v. 
Vill. of Bedford Park, 528 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e should not reject [a state-law 
remedy as inadequate] unless the remedy . . . can readily be characterized as inadequate to the 
point that it is meaningless or nonexistent and, thus, in no way can be said to provide the due 
process relief guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.”). 
85 866 N.E.2d 592 (Ill App. Ct. 2007). 
86 Id. at 603. 
87 See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. Contrary to what is dictated by the statute, the 
prevailing wage is typically updated several times a year. Id. 
88 936 F.2d 1448, 1453-57 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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ones. And when a new classification is created, such as a classification for 
landscape work, the department will look at what landscapers are actually paid to 
determine what the prevailing wage is instead of asking the absurd question of 
what workers previously classified as “laborers” were paid on public works 
projects. 
B. Comparing the Illinois Prevailing Wages Act to the Prevailing Wage Acts of 
Other States 
It is useful to compare the Illinois Prevailing Wage Act to the Little Davis-
Bacons in other states. A.J. Thieblot conducted a comparative analysis of state 
prevailing wage laws, grouping them into three different categories by their 
relative strength: “weaker,” “average,” and “stronger.”89 Illinois was in the 
“stronger” category along with Missouri, Rhode Island, Ohio, Michigan (whose 
laws were briefly held unconstitutional), Minnesota, Washington, Hawaii, 
California, New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts.90 A comparison of Illinois 
with other states that have relatively strong prevailing wage acts reveals first, that 
the level of deference to unions in Illinois is unusually high, and second, that none 
of the other states limit the calculation of their prevailing wage rates to wages 
paid on public works projects. 
The Illinois Prevailing Wage Act is peculiar in that the statutory language 
suggests that surveys must be conducted, though in practice surveys have not 
been conducted since 2001 when IDOL began relying on the rates set in collective 
bargaining agreements. Six of the other “stronger” prevailing wage act states use 
collective bargaining agreements that, in some cases, are subject to stipulations: 
California,91 Massachusetts,92 Michigan,93 New Jersey,94 New York,95 and Ohio.96 
                                                 
89 See A.J. Thieblot, Prevailing Wage Laws and Black Employment in the Construction Industry, 
J. OF LAB. RES., 154, 158 n.6 (1999). 
90 Id. 
91 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1773 (West 2011) (“In determining the rates, the Director of Industrial 
Relations shall ascertain and consider the applicable wage rates established by collective 
bargaining agreements and the rates that may have been predetermined for federal public works, 
within the locality and in the nearest labor market area. Where the rates do not constitute the rates 
actually prevailing in the locality, the director shall obtain and consider further data from the labor 
organizations and employers or employer associations concerned, including the recognized 
collective bargaining representatives for the particular craft, classification, or type of work 
involved.” (emphasis added)); see also Indep. Roofing Contractors v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 28 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 557 (1994) (“The statutory scheme contains express safeguards to prevent such 
delegation from occurring. The Department is allowed to rely on a collective bargaining 
agreement as a basis for a determination only where the agreement is evidence of ‘the rates 
actually prevailing in the locality.’”). 
92 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 26 (West 2004) (“[I]f, in any of the towns where the 
works are to be constructed, a wage rate or wage rates have been established in certain trades and 
occupations by collective agreements or understandings in the private construction industry 
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Three conduct surveys and use the modal rate: Hawaii,97 Minnesota,98 and 
Missouri.99 Washington defines the prevailing wage as the wage paid to a 
                                                                                                                                     
between organized labor and employers, the rate or rates to be paid on said works shall not be less 
than the rates so established; provided further, that in towns where no such rate or rates have been 
so established, the wages paid to mechanics, teamsters, chauffeurs and laborers on public works, 
shall not be less than the wages paid to the employees in the same trades and occupations by 
private employers engaged in the construction industry.” (emphasis added)); see also Constr. 
Indus. of Mass. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 546 N.E.2d 367, 373-74 (1989) (holding that the 
use of a collective bargaining agreement to set the prevailing wage for Teamsters was not an 
unconstitutional delegation of power to private parties). 
93 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 408.554 (West 1999) (“The commissioner shall establish 
prevailing wages and fringe benefits at the same rate that prevails on projects of a similar character 
in the locality under collective agreements or understandings between bona fide organizations of 
construction mechanics and their employers. Such agreements and understandings, to meet the 
requirements of this section, shall not be controlled in any way by either an employee or employer 
organization.” (emphasis added)); see also Associated Builders & Contractors v. Dir., Dept. of 
Consumer & Indus. Services, 705 N.W.2d 509, 514 (2005) (citing West Ottawa Schools, 309 
N.W.2d 220, 224) (“The Legislature did not confer on the unions and the contractor/employers 
the power to set the prevailing wage rate for public contracts. It merely adopted, as the critical 
standard to be used by the Department of Labor in determining prevailing wage, the wage rate 
arrived at through a collective bargaining process which is completely unrelated to and 
independent of the prevailing wage statute. The purpose of collective bargaining is not to set the 
wage scale for public projects but rather to set the wage scale for all construction projects.” 
(emphasis added)). 
94
 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56.30 (West 2011); see also Male v. Ernest Renda Contracting Co., 
301 A.2d 153, 156 (App. Div. 1973) aff'd, 314 A.2d 361 (1974) (“Second, the number of 
collective bargaining agreements covering a particular type of work within each county are 
ascertained. Third, if there exists more than one collective bargaining agreement covering a 
particular type of work, he determines which agreement covers the majority of workers for a 
particular craft or trade. Fourth, the wage rate set forth in that collective bargaining agreement 
becomes the prevailing wage rate for that craft or trade in the county concerned.”). 
95 See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220 (McKinney 2001) (“The ‘prevailing rate of wage,’ for the intents and 
purposes of this article, shall be the rate of wage paid in the locality, as hereinafter defined, by 
virtue of collective bargaining agreements between bona fide labor organizations and employers of 
the private sector, performing public or private work provided that said employers employ at least 
thirty per centum of workers, laborers or mechanics in the same trade or occupation in the locality 
where the work is being performed.”). 
96 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4115.05 (West 2007) (“For purposes of establishing the prevailing 
rate of wages, a labor organization that is a party to a collective bargaining agreement, contract, or 
understanding . . . that establishes wages for a trade or occupation typically employed on public 
improvements shall file with the director of commerce all relevant portions of any such agreement, 
contract, or understanding to which the labor organization is a party.”). 
97 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 104-2 (West 2008) (“The rates of wages which the director shall regard 
as prevailing in each corresponding classification of laborers and mechanics shall be the rate of 
wages paid to the greatest number of those employed in the State, the modal rate, in the 
corresponding classes of laborers or mechanics on projects that are similar to the contract work.”) 
98 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 177.42 (West 2006) (“‘Prevailing wage rate’ means the hourly basic 
rate of pay plus the contribution paid to or for the largest number of workers engaged in the same 
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majority of workers in a particular trade in a given locality, but in the event there 
is not a majority rate, then the average of all available rates is used.100 Rhode 
Island uses the federal Davis-Bacon rates, though ambiguous language in its 
statute suggests that is not the only option available.101 
Aside from the method used to calculate the prevailing wage, Illinois has a 
comparatively strong version of the law in that it has no minimum value before 
the Act applies.102 Only eight of the other thirty-two states with prevailing wage 
acts in place have no threshold amount.103 Other states, such as New Jersey, have 
relatively low threshold amounts.104 But about half set the threshold above 
$25,000, and some states set it much higher.105 For example, Maryland has the 
highest threshold, requiring the prevailing wage to be paid only on jobs over 
$500,000.106 
C. Applying Public Choice Theory to the Prevailing Wage Act 
1. Agency Capture 
The reluctance of IDOL to recognize a new category and to limit the data 
used in the calculation of the prevailing wage to wages paid on public works 
projects supports the theory that the department has been captured by organized 
labor. Roger Noll posits that “[m]ost regulatory issues are of deep interest to 
regulated industries, with a very substantial amount of income for these industries 
riding on the decision.”107 Even though the general public has a stake that “may in 
                                                                                                                                     
class of labor within the area . . . .”); see also In re Truck Rental Rate Effective December 20, 
2004, No. A06-638, 2007 WL 229101 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2007) (describing the survey 
process used to calculate prevailing wage rate). 
99 See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.210 (West 2005); see also Branson R-IV Sch. Dist. v. Labor & 
Indus. Relations Comm'n, 888 S.W.2d 717, 725 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the modal method of ascertaining the prevailing wage).  
100 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.12.010 (West 2012); see also Lockheed Shipbuilding Co. v. 
Dep't of Labor & Indus. for State of Wash., 783 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). 
101 See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 37-13-8 (West 2006) (“In making a determination, the director of 
labor may adopt and use such appropriate and applicable prevailing wage rate determinations as 
have been made by the secretary of labor of the United States of America in accordance with the 
Davis-Bacon Act.” (emphasis added)). 
102 See Dollar Threshold Amount for Contract Coverage Under State Prevailing Wage Laws, U.S. 
DEPT. OF LABOR (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/dollar.htm#.UKHZzOOe83Q.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. New Jersey’s threshold is $1000. California and Rhode Island have the same threshold, 
which is the lowest of all existing thresholds. A few others are similarly low, like the $2000 
threshold of Hawaii and Alaska. Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL PROPOSALS 
41 (1971). 
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the aggregate be even higher . . . it is diffused among a large number of 
unorganized individuals.”108 Consequently, an agency decision that is unfavorable 
to a special interest group is likely to be fought, while a decision that is against 
the interest of the general public is unlikely to irritate enough people for them to 
organize against it.109 This gives agencies an incentive to give regulated interest 
groups a little more than they deserve.110 
2. Concentrated Groups, Diffuse Groups, and Information Costs 
Public choice theory has something to offer our understanding of the 
political dynamics of the Prevailing Wage Act. One need not accept the tenets of 
public choice generally to admit that this law is peculiarly within public choice’s 
purview. A fair description of the public choice approach has been offered by 
Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey: “A less grandiose version of the economic 
theory would simply postulate (1) that reelection is an important motive of 
legislators, (2) that constituent and contributor interests thereby influence 
legislators, and (3) that small, easily organized interest groups have an influence 
disproportionate to the size of their membership.”111 
The economic theory of legislation suggests that the political process 
creates a market for legislation, where politicians essentially auction off 
legislative protection for money or votes.112 Concentrated groups tend to fare 
better than diffuse groups in the market for legislation for a number of reasons:  
Fewness of members reduces transaction costs, increases the cost 
of free riding (by making it less likely that there will be anything to 
take a free ride on—i.e. each member is more important to the 
group’s success the fewer the members there are), increases the 
benefits of redistribution, and makes organized opposition less 
likely by reducing the cost per opponent.113 




111 DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 33 (1991). 
112 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 534 (6th ed. 2003). 
113 Id. at 535; see also John O. McGinnis & Max Schanzenbach, The Case Against Public Sector 
Unions, Hoover Institute (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-
review/article/43266 (“Taxpayers are a classic example of a diffuse group whose influence in 
politics is far less than their numbers. Because each taxpayer is less likely to decide an election 
through his vote than he is to be hit by lightning on his way to the polls, a taxpayer rationally does 
not invest much in learning about government policies or the positions of the candidates. In 
contrast, public employee unions are a classic example of a concentrated group which can monitor 
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Organized labor, with its relatively homogenous agenda and forced political 
participation through collection of union dues, is a quintessential concentrated 
group. 
Of course, the plaintiffs in Beary were members of a contractor’s 
association, which functions almost exactly like a union and is thus equally 
susceptible to being characterized as a concentrated group. Undeniably, the 
contractor’s association engaged in protracted litigation in Bleary because it was 
in its economic interest to do so; it was not simply acting as a private attorney 
general. But it was not a purely private dispute. At issue was the use of public 
funds.  The contractor’s association sued over IDOL’s alleged abuse of the 
authority delegated to it by the state to determine the rate of prevailing wages. 
Because taxpayers are the group supplying the money used to pay those wages, 
the department’s artificial wage inflation through the use of figures provided to it 
by unions pits the interests of a concentrated group against those of a diffuse 
group of taxpayers. Another way the Act works against the interests of taxpayers 
becomes apparent when one considers the stakes of the Beary litigation for the 
contractor’s association. At least one immediate interest is obvious: all of the 
contractors were subject to enforcement actions that carried potentially significant 
penalties for noncompliance with the Act.114 But it seems doubtful that they 
would go through all the trouble and expense of protracted litigation simply to 
avoid penalties and interest on back pay. 
Rather, a more long-term interest also seems apparent. As noted, among the 
most upset about the prevailing wage are municipal governments.115 Landscaping 
contractors are significantly more likely to get municipal landscaping contracts if 
municipalities do not need to pay the prevailing wage on those contracts. 
Conversely, if they are required to pay prevailing wages on landscaping work, the 
municipalities are unlikely to hire landscaping contractors because they are not 
required to pay their own employees the prevailing wage to do the same work.116 
                                                                                                                                     
the behavior of government officials. Public employee unions, by virtue of the dues they collect 
from members, possess war chests from which they can contribute to politicians who support their 
goals. These goals, not surprisingly, involve first and foremost accruing benefits for their 
members. It is an axiom of political science that politicians tend to reward concentrated groups at 
the expense of the public, because these groups can in turn provide the most rewards to them.”). 
114 See Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan, 667 F.3d at 947, 949 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 354 (2012); see also 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/11 (LexisNexis 2008). 
115 See subpart III(A). 
116 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/3 (LexisNexis 2008) (“Only such laborers, workers and 
mechanics as are directly employed by contractors or subcontractors in actual construction work 
on the site of the building or construction job, and laborers, workers and mechanics engaged in the 
transportation of materials and equipment to or from the site, but not including the transportation 
by the sellers and suppliers or the manufacture or processing of materials or equipment, in the 
execution of any contract or contracts for public works with any public body shall be deemed to be 
employed upon public works.”). 
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The perverse result is that municipalities are effectively precluded from hiring 
firms that have figured out how to do something efficiently and cheaply because 
the Act requires them to pay outside contractors more than state employees to do 
the exact same work. And, of course, more private employees would be paid if the 
state was not paying the bill. 
3. Defining and Measuring the Prevailing Wage 
The idea of agency capture and the disparate political impact of 
concentrated groups helps explain why the Illinois Prevailing Wage Act is so 
unique and how it is being used in a way that seems to favor special interests over 
the interests of the public generally. Justice Bowman’s aside in Illinois Landscape 
Contractors Ass’n v. Department of Labor about what is to be used in the 
calculation of the prevailing wage is telling.117 It exemplifies the gap between 
“prevailing wage” as a term of art and the common-sense notion of what the 
prevailing wage is. Since that gap is the product of the peculiar way the wage is 
calculated, the Prevailing Wage Act amounts to a form of “legislative 
deception.”118 When legislative deception is combined with the information costs 
voters face in learning about political issues, serious problems for democracy are 
created. 
One might object to the idea that there could be a common-sense notion of 
what “prevailing wage” means because the concept is such an abstraction. But a 
universal notion or consensus on what “prevailing wage” means is not needed. 
What matters is that the phrase evokes something like a snapshot of the mean, 
median, or mode wage rate in a particular trade at a particular point in time, and 
that it does not rely solely only on wages paid for public works projects. Perhaps 
the most frustrating aspect of both Justice Bowman’s opinion and the result in 
Beary is that the agency in charge of defining the prevailing wage chose to ignore 
real-world facts to keep the prevailing wage for landscapers artificially inflated. 
Thus, even though creating a new category for “plantsmen” would arguably have 
provided a more accurate picture of the labor market, IDOL chose to retain the 
existing classification of landscapers as “laborers.” 
Despite what looked like a prima facie case of agency capture, the result is 
still plausible under the statute. The burden is on the party proposing the new 
wage classification to establish that the work performed by those in the new 
                                                 
117 See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
118 See Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, 
and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 437, 439 (2006) (symposium) (“In the case of [macro-level legislative] deception, in 
contrast, the legislature leaves substantive law unchanged on its face, but alters it in a generally 
applicable manner by enacting procedural or evidentiary modifications that have the effect of 
transforming the essence—or what can appropriately be described as the ‘DNA’—of that law.”). 
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classification is sufficiently dissimilar to the work involved in their existing 
laborer classification.119 The actual text of the decision is unavailable, but the 
summarized findings of the administrative law judge included the following: 
(4) the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a new 
class or new wage; (5) the test is whether the petitioner has proved, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the work described in the 
proposed classification is sufficiently dissimilar to the work 
performed in the existing classification; (6) the testimony 
presented establishes that the work of landscapers falls under the 
classification of “laborer” because landscapers possess the same 
skills and knowledge and use the same tools as laborers; (7) there 
was no evidence establishing the number of hours laborers spend 
on landscape work for public works projects; and (8) the fact that 
the Landscape CBA exists does not mean that [I]DOL is obligated 
to recognize its new classes.120 
It is difficult to see why this should be the procedure. What makes very 
little sense about this process is that evidence that the U.S. Department of Labor 
(or any other jurisdiction) has a separate classification for “plantsman” is 
inadmissible because those jurisdictions use private wages in their calculations.121 
D. Counter-Arguments 
1. The Prevailing Wage Act as Labor Subsidy 
A potential counter-argument to this analysis is that the law might be 
viewed as a form of subsidy or welfare, and therefore has a legitimate purpose.122 
For instance, some contend that the Davis-Bacon Act was a Keynesian stimulus 
program.123 A more recent example is President Barack Obama’s signature 
stimulus legislation, much of which involved funding for federal public works 
                                                 
119 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/9 (2008). 
120 Ill. Landscape Contractors Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 866 N.E.2d 592, 599 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
121 See id. at 596 (IDOL “cannot consider USDOL determinations, because USDOL uses both 
public and private hours when it determines federal wages pursuant to the Davis–Bacon Act.”). 
122 See Glassman, supra note 14 (“One feature of public construction projects that the critics seem 
less willing to recognize, however, is that they function also as a costly welfare system for union 
workers. This feature stems from the federal Davis-Bacon Act, under which construction projects 
funded entirely or in part by the federal government must pay a government determined 
“prevailing wage” to the workers on the project.”). 
123 See, e.g., Northrup & White, supra note 10, at 80. 
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projects.124 It has thus been argued that the extraordinary compensation laborers 
are receiving for public works projects is a form of stimulus. Some proponents 
have pointed out that critics of the Davis-Bacon Act (and, by implication, 
prevailing wage acts generally) tend to think construction workers are overpaid, 
although this is not the case because they often do not work the entire year.125 
However, this argument presents serious problems for democratic theory. If 
the rationale of the law is stimulus, but that rationale is achieved under the guise 
of the “Prevailing Wage Act,” then voters are being misled. The stated purpose of 
the Act is to ensure that the public works will be completed “without interruptions 
or delay by workmen of average skill.”126 A second purpose of the act commonly 
cited is that it protects local workers by removing the incentive to import 
inexpensive labor from outside the area where the work is being done.127 Voters 
who might support the law under those rationales may feel differently if the 
legislation were described as the labor subsidy that it actually is. 
Public choice theorists and economists have observed for decades that there 
is little incentive for voters to learn much about the decisions their representative 
make before going to the polls.128 Using a law to do something other than its 
stated purpose compounds this problem and gives legislators a way to transfer 
money from a diffuse group of voters to the more concentrated group of laborers 
on public works projects. If the people of Illinois decide that labor is in such poor 
shape that it merits a subsidy, they should pursue a subsidy directly instead of the 
roundabout way of a prevailing wage. 
2. The Race to the Bottom 
Proponents of prevailing wage laws also contend that they prevent 
governments from engaging in myopic cost-cutting, which would thereby cause a 
race to the bottom in the construction industry and ultimately damage the 
community: 
                                                 
124 See generally David Firestone, Don’t Tell Anyone, But the Stimulus Worked, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
16, 2012, at 10. 
125 Micheal Bruton, No Profit in Repealing Davis-Bacon, CHI. TRIB., May 23, 1995, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1995-05-23/news/9505230174_1_davis-bacon-act-hourly-wage-
rates-repeal (“Proponents of repeal seem to believe that construction workers are grossly overpaid, 
costing the government billions of dollars a year. But the average construction worker makes 
about $578 a week, which amounts to $30,058 a year, assuming he or she is lucky enough to 
actually work 50 weeks a year, which most don't.”). 
126 Letter from Roland Burris, Illinois Attorney General, to Shinae Chun, Director of the Illinois 
Department of Labor (Mar. 29, 1993), available at 
http://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/1993/93-009.pdf. 
127 Id. 
128 See, e.g.,POSNER, supra note 112. 
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Prevailing wage laws emerged from a concern that cutthroat 
competition over wages in construction would lead the industry 
down a low-wage, low-skill development path. This was said to 
put the quality of construction at risk and lead to an itinerant, 
footloose low-wage construction labor force. Poor construction 
workers would make poor neighbors and potential burdens on the 
community. Reasonably paid construction workers, on the other 
hand, held out the possibility of being solid neighbors, good 
citizens and productive members of the community. Government, 
by the operation of prevailing wage laws, was supposed to get out 
of the business of cutting government costs by cutting the wages of 
its citizens. Whatever labor standards had been established, 
whatever wages prevailed in a local community, that is what the 
law said government should pay on public works.129 
Joseph Costigan, former director of IDOL and the defendant in Beary by 
virtue of the position, advanced a form of this argument while in office.130 
Nonetheless, this argument finds its refutation in the many workers who 
receive lower-than-prevailing wages every day; they have not yet caused the 
social fabric of Illinois to disintegrate. Furthermore, as George C. Leef points out, 
“allowing contractors to employ workers who will accept less than the 
‘prevailing’ wage does not ‘drive down’ wages. It simply means that construction 
workers who are usually paid at the union scale will not always be employed on 
government projects.”131 Needless to say, the parade of horribles that this 
argument suggests would transpire in the absence of prevailing wage acts is 
impossible to prove empirically. It is nothing more than a naked political 
argument, unsupported by fact. 
3. No Impact on Costs 
Yet another argument advanced in support of prevailing wage laws is that 
they have no inflationary impact on costs.132 This argument also is almost entirely 
without empirical support, and is based on just one study about a supposedly 
                                                 
129 HAMID AZARI-RAD ET. AL., THE ECONOMICS OF PREVILING WAGE LAWS 23 (2005). 
130 Pat Barcas, Costigan: Best Defense for Workers is a Good Offense, FOX VALLEY LAB. NEWS, 
Feb. 3, 2012, http://foxvalleylabornews.com/2012/02/03/costigan-best-defense-for-workers-is-a-
good-offense/ (“At the department, we see the low road taken a lot. People who don’t pay 
prevailing wage, or miss-categorize [sic] independent contractors. These people don’t care. It’s a 
race to the bottom. . . . Values that I call high road values help both contractors and workers. 
We’re all in this toghether [sic]. Help each other, and this helps you.”). 
131 Leef, supra note 4, at 149. 
132 See, e.g., AZARI-RAD, supra note 129. 
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comparative labor law in British Columbia.133 In fact, the majority of the evidence 
is to the contrary. Leef describes inflation of the cost of public construction as the 
“most salient effect” of prevailing wage legislation.134 He cites four main ways 
prevailing wage acts increase costs:  preventing competitive bidding on the cost of 
labor; interference with efficient labor utilization as a consequence of mandated 
adherence to union work rules; the imposition of additional costs of compliance; 
and the added costs of administering the regulation—including the costs of 
litigation against contractors.135 
Michigan provides a great natural experiment in the effect of prevailing 
wage laws. A district court declared Michigan’s robust prevailing wage law to be 
preempted in 1994 by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.136 This 
decision was reversed by the Sixth Circuit in 1997, so the period between the two 
decisions provided ample data for economists to study the effect of Michigan’s 
prevailing wage on the cost of public construction.137 Unsurprisingly, non-union 
contractors substantially underbid union contractors for many public construction 
jobs.138 Economist Richard Vedder concluded that, in 1995 alone, Michigan 
“saved approximately $275 million in construction outlays because competitive 
bidding prevailed rather than the ‘prevailing wage’ law.”139 
Even if these arguments did support the continued existence of the Davis-
Bacon Act and other prevailing wage laws, they do little to justify Illinois’ unique 
approach to the law. Recall again the disparity between the required rate of pay on 
a federal project and the Illinois project cited by Judge Zagel.140 Studies like this 
may justify the federal rate of wage or states that have something close to union 
scale, but they do not support IDOL’s current method of calculating the rate, 
which keeps the subsidization of labor at a comparatively high level. In contrast, 
creating a new category of “plantsmen” and allowing the use of private wages to 
figure out the prevailing wage rate for that category would save the state a 
considerable amount of money. Furthermore, even if the amount of money saved 
by the new category would equate to only a small fraction of the state’s deficit, it 
is still taxpayer money being wasted. 
                                                 
133 Id. 
134 Leef, supra note 4, at 140. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 141. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. (noting that Michigan’s prevailing wage has historically been union scale.). 
139 Id. 
140 Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Shannon, 2011 WL 1100213, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff’d sub nom, 
Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan, 667 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 354 
(2012). 
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CONCLUSION 
The challenge to the Prevailing Wage Act in Beary was defeated on sound 
constitutional grounds. But the Beary decision, and the efforts of Illinois 
landscaping contractors more generally, shed light on problems with the Act that 
should be remedied. Ideally, the legislature will fix these problems by scrapping 
the Prevailing Wage Act in its entirety and replacing it with a new law that is 
more narrowly aimed at achieving the ends the Act purportedly serves. But if such 
action proves legislatively impossible, taxpayers should oppose the insidious 
expansion of the Act and demand that legislators institute more modest reforms 
such as limiting application of the Prevailing Wage Act to jobs above a certain 
dollar threshold. Illinois can ill-afford the bureaucratic waste engendered by the 
Prevailing Wage Act in its current state. 
 
